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Abstract
Whenever a social media user decides to share a story, she is typically pleased to receive likes, comments, shares,
or, more generally, feedback from her followers. As a result, she may feel compelled to use the feedback she receives
to (re-)estimate her followers’ preferences and decide which stories to share next to receive more (positive) feedback.
Under which conditions can she succeed? In this work, we first look into this problem from a theoretical perspective
and then provide a set of practical algorithms to identify and characterize such behavior in social media.
More specifically, we address the above problem from the perspective of sequential decision making and utility
maximization. For a wide variety of utility functions, we first show that, to succeed, a user requires to actively trade
off exploitation—sharing stories which lead to more (positive) feedback—and exploration—sharing stories to learn
about her followers’ preferences. However, exploration is not necessary if a user utilizes the feedback her followers
provide to other users in addition to the feedback she receives. Then, we develop a utility estimation framework
for observation data, which relies on statistical hypothesis testing to determine whether a user utilizes the feedback
she receives from each of her followers to decide what to post next. Experiments on synthetic data illustrate our
theoretical findings and show that our estimation framework is able to accurately recover users’ underlying utility
functions. Experiments on several real datasets gathered from Twitter and Reddit reveal that up to 82% (43%) of the
Twitter (Reddit) users in our datasets do use the feedback they receive to decide what to post next.
1 Introduction
Political parties, corporations, celebrities as well as ordinary people use social media to build, reach, and share stories
with their own audience. For example, political leaders share details about their activities in hopes of tapping new
voters [1], corporations offer insights about their latest products and services with potential customers [16], celebrities
give a glimpse of their lavish lifestyle to strengthen their fan base [2], and ordinary people share personal stories with
their friends [3]. In all these cases, social media users—politicians, corporations, celebrities, or ordinary people—
receive feedback from their followers—their voters, customers, fans, or friends—by means of likes, comments, or
shares. Moreover, this feedback provides hints about the preferences of their followers: it lets the users know what does
or does not work, and it influences what they share next, as shown by an increasing number of empirical studies [21,
22, 17, 24, 15, 13, 11, 12, 19, 20]. In this context, it is perhaps surprising that feedback models of posting behavior
are largely nonexistent to date. However, such models are of outstanding interest since they would allow us to answer
two fundamental questions:
(i) Can a user succeed at maximizing the (positive) feedback she receives if, a priori, does not know her followers’
preferences?
(ii) Can we determine whether a user utilizes the feedback she receives from each of her followers to decide what to
post next using observational data?
By answering the above questions, we will not only advance our understanding of how feedback may influence
a user’s posting behavior but will also facilitate the design of more effective algorithms for viral marketing and user
personalization.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
00
44
0v
2 
 [c
s.S
I] 
 19
 Se
p 2
01
9
1.1 Overview of our Approach
In this paper, we introduce a utility maximization feedback model of posting behavior, which is specially well-fitted to
investigate the above questions. More specifically, we assume that each user has an underlying (linear) utility function,
which assigns different weights to the feedback the user receives from each of her followers. Moreover, every time the
user shares a story with her followers, they provide their feedback according to a set of preferences. If the user knows
perfectly her followers’ preferences, we can then show that the optimal posting strategy, which maximizes the user’s
utility function, is deterministic. If the user does not know their preferences, we have the following theoretical results:
I. If the user estimates her followers’ preferences from the feedback she receives over time, she needs to re-
sort to posting strategies that effectively trade-off exploitation—sharing stories to maximize her utility—and
exploration—sharing stories to learn about her followers’ preferences. More formally, we can show that poste-
rior sampling based posting strategies achieve logarithmic regret (i.e., O(log T )) while strategies based on point
estimates suffer from linear regret (i.e., Θ(T )) where T denotes the total time steps.
II. If the user can, in addition to the feedback she receives, also use the feedback her followers give to other users
to estimate her followers’ preferences, she is better off using it. More specifically, we can show that posterior
sampling based posting strategies achieve constant regret (i.e., O(1)) and, perhaps surprisingly, strategies based
on point estimates achieve sublinear regret (i.e., o(T )).
In addition to the above theoretical analysis, we also develop a utility estimation framework, which relies on statistical
hypothesis testing to determine whether a user utilizes the feedback she receives from each of her followers to decide
what to post next. Finally, we perform a variety of experiments using both synthetic and real Twitter and Reddit data.
Experiments on synthetic data illustrate our theoretical findings and show that our utility estimation framework is
able to accurately recover the users’ underlying utility functions. Experiments on several real datasets gathered from
Twitter and Reddit reveal that up to 82% (43%) of the Twitter (Reddit) users in our datasets do use the feedback they
receive to decide what to post next.
1.2 Related Work
In addition to the empirical studies on how feedback influences user behavior, discussed previously, our work also
relates to revealed preference theory, smart broadcasting, and multi-armed bandits.
Revealed preference theory. Since the pioneering work by Samuelson [29], reveal preference theory has become
a well-established economic theory that analyzes choices made by individuals, particularly to understand consumer
behavior. It typically assumes that each consumer decides to buy a bundle of goods, among several alternatives, on the
basis of a (concave) nondecreasing utility function [26, 27, 4]. The works most closely related to ours [10, 32, 18, 9, 7]
aim to develop efficient algorithms to estimate utility functions from revealed preference data as well as analyze their
sample complexity. However, their problem setting is very different from ours: (i) the utility a consumer obtains from
buying a bundle of goods is deterministic, however, the feedback a social media user receives from her followers varies
randomly and, thus, the utility a user obtains from sharing a story is stochastic; (ii) a consumer can evaluate the utility
of a bundle of goods exactly, however, a social media user needs to guess the utility she will obtain from sharing a
story on the basis of an estimation of her followers’ preferences from the feedback she received in the past; and, (iii)
each consumer’s decision is independent, however, each social media user’s decision is part of a sequential decision
making process.
Smart broadcasting. In recent years, there has been some work on smart broadcasting [30, 34, 25, 33], which aims
to find the times when a user should post to receive more views, likes, comments, or shares from her followers. In
smart broadcasting, there is also a user who aims to maximize the impact of the stories she shares, however, the focus
is on when to share while our focus is on what to share. In addition, algorithms for smart broadcasting are based
on temporal point processes and stochastic optimal control, while we resort to online learning techniques and convex
optimization.
Multi-armed bandits. The proof techniques used for deriving regret bounds in bandit problems [5, 8, 23, 6] are
related to the ones we use to derive the regret bounds in our work. However, there are several key differences: (i)
we allow a user to utilize the feedback her followers provide to other users to estimate her followers’ preferences,
whereas, in a traditional bandit setting, a user could only utilize the feedback she receives on the stories she shares; (ii)
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our proof techniques allow for users with several followers, in contrast, in a traditional bandit setting, it would only
allow for users with one follower.
2 Feedback model of posting behavior
In this section, we introduce our feedback model of posting behavior, starting from the problem setting it is designed
for.
2.1 Problem Setting
Let u be a social media user and N (u) be her set of followers. Then, at each time t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, the user shares a
story from a topic ct ∈ C, with |C| = K, and each of her followers decides whether to give (or not to give) feedback.1
Moreover, for each follower v ∈ N (u), we denote the feedback she gave (or did not give) to user u and, possibly, to
any other user in the social media platform2, up to time t− 1 by
Hv(t) = {(c, l(c)) | the story was posted before t},
where c denotes the topic of the story, l(c) = 1 means that she gave feedback to the story and l(c) = 0 otherwise. We
denote the collection of feedback from followers N (u) asH(t) = (Hv(t))v∈N (u).
At time t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, we assume that the user u samples the topic c of the story she shares from a categorical
distribution ct ∼ p(c|H(t)), which may depend on the history of her followers’ feedback. Also, given a topic c, each
follower v gives feedback with conditional probability pv(l(c) = 1|c) = qcv , where we can think of qcv as follower
v’s preference for topic c. Here, we assume that, in general, followers may differ in their preferences, i.e., qcv 6= qcv′
for v 6= v′. Moreover, we denote qc = (qcv)v∈N (u) and Q = (qcv)c∈C,v∈N (u).
2.2 Utility Maximization Feedback Model
We assume that user u aims to find (and utilize) the categorical distribution p∗(c|H(t)) that maximizes a (linear) utility
function UTIL(T ), defined as
UTIL(T ) = E
∑
t∈[T ]
 ∑
v∈N (u)
avlv(ct) + auxct
 (1)
where the expectation is over the topics ct ∼ p∗(c|H(t)) of the stories the user shares and the feedback lv(ct) ∼
Bernoulli(qctv). The weights av ≥ 0 model the importance that user u gives to the feedback she receives from
follower v, the parameters 0 ≤ xct ≤ 1 encode user u’s preference for topic ct, the weight au ≥ 0 models the
importance she gives to her own preferences, and we assume that
∑
v∈N (u) av +au = 1. In the above utility function,
the greater the importance av user u gives to the feedback she receives from a specific follower v, the greater the utility
gain she will obtain from posting a story from a topic that follower v prefers. Similarly, the greater the importance
au she gives to her own preferences x = (xc)c∈C , the greater the utility gain she will obtain from just posting a story
from a topic she prefers.
Next, using the linearity of expectation and the law of iterated expectation, we can rewrite Eq. 1 as follows:
UTIL(T ) =
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
v∈N (u)
Ect∼p∗
[
Elv(ct)|ct [avlv(ct) + auxct ]
]
=
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
v∈N (u)
Ect∼p∗ [avqctv + auxct ]
=
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
c∈C
p∗(c|H(t)) (a†qc + auxc) (2)
1For simplicity, we assume that receiving feedback is always positive, e.g., we assume that receiving a like is always positive. Our formulation
can be easily adapted to scenarios with positive and negative feedback, e.g., upvotes and downvotes.
2We will study two scenarios: (i) the user has access only to the feedback she has received; and (ii) the user has access to the feedback she has
received as well as the feedback her followers have given to other users.
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where a = (av)v∈N (u) and † denotes the transpose operator.
Finally, we can formally state the utility maximization problem user u aims to solve as:
maximize
p(c|H(t))
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
c∈C
p(c|H(t)) (a†qc + auxc)
subject to 0 ≤ p(c|H(t)) ≤ 1 ∀c ∈ C,∑
c∈C
p(c|H(t)) = 1,
(3)
where the followers’ preferences Q = (qc)c∈C are generally unknown.
3 Solving the utility maximization problem
In this section, we develop an efficient algorithm to solve the utility maximization problem defined by Eq. 3 and study
its theoretical guarantees in a variety of settings.
3.1 Known Preferences
As a warm up, we first assume that the user u knows her followers’ preferences Q. In this setting, it readily follows
that the optimal distribution p∗(c|H(t)) that maximizes Eq. 3 does not depend on the feedback history and is given by
p∗(c|H(t)) = p∗(c) = I
[
c = argmax
c′
(
a†qc′ + auxc′)
)]
, (4)
where I(·) denotes the indicator function. In this case, note that the optimal mechanism for maximizing utility is
deterministic (assuming ties over different topics are broken in a predetermined way).
3.2 Unknown Preferences: Exploration Exploitation Trade-off
In this section, we consider a more realistic setting where the user u does not know the preferences Q. For this setting,
we assume that the user can access historical feedback data to estimate these unknown preferences. When user u does
not know her followers’ preferences, she needs to trade off exploitation, i.e., maximizing utility, and exploration, i.e.,
learning about her followers’ preferences Q from historical feedback data.
To this aim, for every topic c ∈ C and follower v ∈ N (u), we assume a Beta prior over the preference parameter
qcv ∼ Beta(α, β). Under this assumption, at each time t, we can use Hv(t) to update the distribution of parameter
qcv(t) as:
p(qcv(t)|Hv(t)) = Beta(α+ ncv(t), β + n¯cv(t)), (5)
where
ncv(t) = |{(c′, l(c′)) ∈ Hv(t) | l(c′) = 1, c′ = c}|,
n¯cv(t) = |{(c′, l(c′)) ∈ Hv(t) | l(c′) = 0, c′ = c}|.
Then, at the beginning of time t, we can estimate the value of each preference parameter qcv(t) in the following
two ways:
I. using point estimates, i.e.,
qˆcv(t) = argmax p(qcv(t)|Hv(t)) = α+ ncv(t)− 1
α+ β + ncv(t) + n¯cv(t)− 2 , (6)
II. via sampling from posterior, i.e.,
qˆcv(t) ∼ p(qcv(t)|Hv(t)). (7)
4
Algorithm 1: Utility maximization for unknown preferences
1: Input: Prior parameters α, β.
2: Output: Category {ct}t∈[T ].
3: for v ∈ N (u) do
4: Hv(t)← ∅;
5: for t ∈ {1, . . . , T} do
6: ct = argmaxc′
(∑
v∈N (u) av qˆc′v(t) + auxc′
)
;
7: SHARE(ct);
8: /* Gather feedback from u’s followers */
9: for v ∈ N (u) do
10: Hv(t+ 1)← Hv(t) ∪ GATHERFEEDBACK(v);
11: for c ∈ C do
12: qˆcv(t+ 1) = ESTIMATE(α, β, c,Hv(t+ 1));
Given these estimates, we select what to share next using an empirical approximation to Eq. 4, i.e.,
pˆ(c|H(t)) = I
[
c = argmax
c′
(
a†qˆc′(t) + auxc′)
)]
. (8)
where qˆc′(t) = (qˆc′v(t))v∈N (u). Algorithm 1 summarizes the complete procedure. Within the algorithm, SHARE
shares a story from a given topic ct, GATHERFEEDBACK gathers the feedback from a follower v, and ESTIMATE
returns an estimate of the preferences parameters using either point estimates or posterior samples.
3.3 Unknown Preferences: Analysis
In this section, we analyze the theoretical guarantees of Algorithm 1 in terms of regret R(T ), which we define as
follows:
R(T ) = UTIL(T )− UTIL∗(T ), (9)
where UTIL(T ) is the utility achieved by Algorithm 1 and UTIL∗(T ) is the utility achieved by the optimal categorical
distribution p∗, given by Eq. 4, under the true preference parameters qcv . Note that an algorithm is called a no-regret
algorithm if the regret grows sublinearly (i.e., o(T )) which implies that the algorithm’s average performance converges
to that of the optimal algorithm.
Note that the utility UTIL(T ) depends on the quality of the estimates qˆcv(t), which in turn depend on (i) the
estimation method (i.e., point estimates vs posterior samples) and (ii) whether each follower’s feedback historyHv(t)
only contains the feedback the follower gives to user u or it also contains the feedback she gives to others. Next, we
study several cases separately.
3.3.1 Point estimates
If the user only has access to the feedback she receives from her followers, we have the following negative result
(proven in Appendix 8.1):
Theorem 1. Assume user u uses point estimates qˆcv(t) and she can only access the feedback she receives from her
followers. Then, Algorithm 1 suffers linear regret Θ(T ).
Perhaps surprisingly, Algorithm 1 with point estimates can actually achieve sublinear regret O(
√
T ) if the user
has access to both the feedback her followers give to her as well as to others, as formalized by the following theorem
(proven in Appendix 8.2):
Theorem 2. Assume user u uses point estimates for the followers’ preferences qˆcv(t) and she can access both the
feedback her followers give to her as well as to others. Furthermore, the amount of feedback each of her followers v
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give to others per topic c follows a Poisson distribution with rate µcv > 0, and let d = α + β. Then, for 2 ≤ d < 3,
Algorithm 1 achieves regret
O
 ∑
c∈C,v∈N (u)
√
T − 1
√
1− e−µcv(T−1)
2
√
(d− 2)µcv
 ,
and, for d ≥ 3, it achieves:
O
 ∑
c∈C,v∈N (u)
T − 1
2
√
(T − 1)µcvt+ d− 3 +
√
d− 3

Here, note that, whenever her followers do not give feedback to others in at least one topic, i.e.,
∑
v∈N (u) µcv = 0
for some c ∈ C, Algorithm 1 will suffer linear regret, which is in agreement with Theorem 1.
3.3.2 Posterior samples
If the user uses posterior samples, she is better off. In this case, Algorithm 1 achieves sublinear regret independently
on whether Hv(t) contains only the feedback she receives or also the feedback her followers give to others. More
formally, we have the following Theorem and Corollary (proven in Appendix 8.2):
Theorem 3. Assume user u uses posterior samples to estimate the followers’ preferences qˆcv(t), she can access both
the feedback her followers give to her as well as to others, and the amount of feedback each of her followers v give to
others per topic c follows a Poisson distribution with rate µcv > 0. Then, Algorithm 1 has regret
O
log
1 + ∑
v∈N (u)
1− exp(−µcvθmT )
µcvθm
 ,
where θm depends on the parameters Q in non-trivial way.
Corollary 4. Assume user u uses posterior samples to estimate the followers’ preferences qˆcv(t) and she can only
access the feedback she receives from her followers. Then, Algorithm 1 has regret O(log T ).
In summary, if user u uses posterior samples instead of point estimates, she can effectively trade off exploitation—
sharing stories for maximizing her utility—and exploration—sharing stories to estimate her followers’ preferences.
Moreover, if she has access to the feedback that her neighbors provide to others, she is better off using it. Such
additional information helps her to maximize her utility more effectively in both cases—posterior samples and point
estimates.
4 Utility estimation framework
In this section, assume we observe both the stories user u shared at each time t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and the feedback she
received from her followers. Then, our goal is to determine whether the user utilizes the feedback she receives from
each of her followers to decide what to post next. To this aim, we first find the model parameters that best fit the
observed data and then determine its statistical significance using statistical hypothesis testing.
4.1 Parameter estimation
To find the weights (av)v∈N (u) and au and parameters (xc)c∈C in Eq. 3 that best fit the observed data, one could resort
to maximum likelihood estimation, i.e.,
maximize
a,au,x
∑
t∈[T ]
log p∗(ct|H(t))
subject to au ≥ 0, av ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ N (u)∑
v∈N (u)
av + au = 1
0 ≤ xc ≤ 1,∀c ∈ C.
(10)
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where p∗(c|H(t)) implicitly depends on (av)v∈N (u) and au since it is the distribution that maximizes the utility
function.
However, the above maximum likelihood estimation problem faces two serious challenges. First, it is stated in
terms of either the optimal distribution p∗(c|H(t)) or, in practice, pˆ(c|H(t)). However, both distributions concentrate
their entire probability mass in one topic. As a consequence, if there exists a time t ∈ {1, . . . , T} in which user u shares
a story from a topic that is not the optimal one to choose, the log-likelihood p∗(c|H(t)) (or log pˆ(c|H(t))) becomes
unbounded. Fortunately, we can overcome this undesirable behavior by approximating the distribution p∗(c|H(t)) (or
pˆ(c|H(t))) using a softmax distribution
pλ(c|H(t)) = exp(λ(a
†qc(t) + auxc))∑
c′∈C exp(λ(a†qc′(t) + auxc′))
(11)
where λ is a given parameter and qc(t) = qc or qc(t) = qˆc(t). Second, if the number of feedback events is large, the
above maximum likelihood estimation problem is not scalable. To ameliorate this second challenge, in the following,
we present a highly efficient heuristic based on linear loss minimization.
Our starting point is the following intuition: at each time t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, if user u is sampling the topic of the
story she shares from a distribution that is close to p(c|H(t)), then the difference between the optimal topic and the
observed topic, i.e.,
max
c′∈C
(
a†qc′(t) + auxju
)− (a†qct(t) + auxct) (12)
should be small. Therefore, our heuristic finds the weights a and au and the parameters x that minimizes this differ-
ence over time. In practice, the solution to the above problem depends on whether we assume that the user utilized
point estimates or posterior samples for the followers’ preferences. Therefore, we proceed in turn.
4.1.1 Point estimates
If we assume that the user utilized point estimates qˆcv(t) for her followers’ preferences, then we minimize:∑
t∈[T ]
max
c′∈C
(
a†qˆc′(t) + auxju
)− (a†qˆct(t) + auxct) (13)
However, the optimization problem is not convex due to the terms auxc and, in its current form, it is difficult to solve
efficiently. Fortunately, an invertible nonlinear transformation of the variables transforms it into a convex problem.
Let zc = auxc and z = (zc)c∈C . Then, we can rewrite the optimization problem as:
minimize
a,au,z
∑
t∈[T ]
[
max
c′∈C
(
a†qˆc′(t) + zc′
)− (a†qˆct(t) + zct)] ,
subject to au ≥ 0, av ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ N (u)∑
v∈N (u)
av + au = 1
0 ≤ zc ≤ au,∀c ∈ C.
which is a convex problem jointly in a, au, and z using composition rules and the fact that the log-exp function is
convex. Once we solve this convex problem, we can recover xc as xc = zc/au.
4.1.2 Posterior samples
If we assume that the user utilized posterior samples qˆcv(t) for her followers’ preferences, then, we need to take the
average of the objective function with respect to the posterior distributions of the followers’ preferences for all topics,
since we do not know which sample the user actually took, i.e., the objective function becomes∑
t∈[T ]
Eqˆ(t),t∈[T ]
[
max
c′∈C
(
a†qˆc′(t) + auxju
)− (a†qˆct(t) + auxct)] ,
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where qˆcv(t) ∼ p(qcv(t)|Hv(t)) for all c ∈ C and v ∈ N (u). In practice, we just replace the above objective function
by the empirical average with respect to the followers’ preferences, i.e.,
∑
t∈[T ]
S∑
s=1
[
max
c′∈C
(
a†qˆ(s)c′ (t) + zc′
)
−
(
a†qˆ(s)ct (t) + zct
)]
,
where qˆ(s)cv (t) ∼ p(qcv(t)|Hv(t)) for all c ∈ C and v ∈ N (u) and S is the number of samples.
4.2 Statistical Hypothesis Testing
Given an estimation of the model parameters, we determine their statistical significance using statistical hypothesis
testing. More specifically, we proceed as follows.
Under the null hypothesisH0, the user does not utilize the feedback she receives from her followers to decide what
to post next, i.e., av = 0 for all v ∈ N (u), and, under the alternative hypothesis, the user does utilize it, i.e., av ≥ 0 for
all v ∈ N (u). Then, for each user u, we use the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) as a test statistic to measure the statistical
power of the feedback data, i.e.,
LLR(u) =
∑
t∈[Tu]
log pλ,aˆ≥0(ct|H(t))−
∑
t∈[Tu]
log pλ,aˆ=0(ct|H(t)),
where Tu is the total number of posts shared by user u. Finally, we assess the statistical significance of the LLR
values using the theoretical distribution of the LLR under the null hypothesis, i.e., χ21(|N (v)| − 1), given by Wilks’
theorem [31], where a high value of LLR allows us to reject the null hypothesis with high probability (low p-value).
5 Experiments on synthetic data
In this section, we experiment with synthetic data to: (i) illustrate the theoretical properties of Algorithm 1, discussed
in Section 3; and (ii) show that our utility estimation framework, discussed in Section 4, can be used to accurately
estimate a user’s utility from historical data.
Experimental setup. We assume that the user u under study has |N (u)| = 10 followers. Then, we sample her weights
av ∼ Dir(γ) and au ∼ Dir(γ) with γ = 0.8, the preferences of her followers qcv ∼ Beta(0.4, 0.6), and her own
preferences xc ∼ Beta(0.4, 0.6). The number of topics |C| = K and rates µcv vary for different experiments and thus
are specified therein.
Regret analysis. First, we consider the case when u estimates her followers’ preferences only on the basis of the
feedback her stories receive from her followers. To that aim, we fix µcv = 0 for all c ∈ C and v ∈ N (u), and simulate
data from our feedback model of posting behavior for different number of topics |C| = K. Then, we investigate the
variation of the regret over time. Figure 1 summarizes the results which show that: (i) point estimates suffer linear
regret whereas, posterior samples achieve logarithmic regret, thereby supporting our theoretical findings in Theorem 1
and Corollary 4; and, (ii) as the number of topics increases, the number of unknown preferences increases, and as a
result, the regret increases.
Next, we consider the case when u additionally utilizes the feedback her followers give to others. To that aim, we
setK = 10, sample µcv ∼ Unif[0, 2µ¯] and simulate our model on user u for different value of µ¯. Figure 2 summarizes
the results which show that: (i) the additional information (i.e., the feedback to others) significantly reduces the
regret—even point estimates achieve a regret of O(
√
T ), and moreover, posterior samples achieve a constant regret
(i.e., O(1)), thereby supporting Theorem 2 and Theorem 3; and, (ii) as µ¯ increases, u estimates their followers’
preferences on the basis of a larger amount of feedback and, as a result, the regret decreases.
Model estimation. To investigate the performance of our utility estimation framework, we first generate H(T ) by
simulating data from our model with K = 10 and sample µcv ∼ Unif[0, 2µ¯]. Then, we train our model using the
generated H(T ), for different T and µ¯ values using our two estimation methods from Section 4. Finally, we evaluate
the accuracy of model estimation procedures in terms of root mean square error (RMSE) between the estimated and
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Figure 1: Regret analysis when user u only leverages the feedback she receives, i.e., µcv = 0. Panel (a) shows that, if
she uses point estimates for her followers’ preferences, Algorithm 1 suffers linear regret. Panel (b) shows that, if she
uses posterior sampling, it achieves logarithmic regret. In both panels, as the number of topics K increases, the regret
increases.
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Figure 2: Regret analysis when user u levegares the feedback she receives as well as the feedback her followers give to
others, i.e., µcv > 0. Panel (a) shows that, if she point estimates for her followers’ preferences, Algorithm 1 achieves
sublinear regret O(
√
T ). Panel (b) shows that, if she uses posterior sampling, it achieves constant regret O(1). In both
panels, as the average rate of feedback to others µcv increases, the regret decreases.
true parameters, i.e.,
RMSE =
√
E(||a− aˆ||2) + E(||au − aˆu||2) + E(||xu − x̂u||2).
Figure 3 summarizes the results the method based on linear loss minimization, which show that, (i) as T increases and
we feed more training samples into the estimation procedure, the accuracy increases; (ii) similarly, as µ¯ increases and
we feed more feedback into the estimation procedure, the accuracy increases; and, (iii) the estimation accuracy for
posterior samples is significantly better than for point estimates;
6 Experiments on real data
In this section, we apply our utility estimation algorithms to several real datasets gathered from Twitter and Reddit and
then, using the utility estimation framework described in Section 4, show that 53% − 82% of the users in the Twitter
datasets and 28%−43% of the users in the Reddit datasets use the feedback they receive from their followers to decide
what to post next.
Data description and experimental setup. We collect Twitter and Reddit data for evaluating our utility estimation
methods.
— Twitter: We used data gathered from Twitter as reported in previous work [14], which comprises the profiles
of 52 million users, 1.9 billion directed follow links among them, and 1.7 billion public tweets posted by these users,
where the underlying link information is based on a snapshot taken at the time of data collection, in September 2009.
Here, we focused on the tweets published during a two month period, from July 1, 2009 to September 26, 2009, which
allows us to consider the set of followers of a user to be approximately static.
In our experiments, a follower v provides feedback to a tweet published by a user u ∈ V if she retweets it3 and
each topic c ∈ C corresponds to the most common4 hashtag a tweet contains. Moreover, using manual inspection, we
3Since back in 2009, Twitter did not have a retweet button, we consider a Jaccard similarity> 80% between tokens contained in two tweets to decide if the latter is
a retweet of former.
4In case a tweet contains more than one hashtag, we consider the hashtag that is more common across our dataset.
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Figure 3: Performance of our utility estimation method based on linear loss minimization in terms of RMSE =√
E(||a− aˆ||2) + E(||au − aˆu||2) + E(||xu − x̂u||2) as T increase. The performance is significantly better when-
ever the user leverages posterior samples for her followers’ preferences.
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Figure 4: Log-likelihood ratio (LLR) values for all users in the three Twitter (first row) and Reddit (second) datasets.
The horizontal red line shows the minimum LLR value to achieve statistical significance at p = 10−8. The results
indicate that we can reject the hypothesis that users do not utilize the feedback they receive from their followers for
53%, 64% and 82% (28%, 42% and 43%) of the users, respectively for Twitter and Reddit datasets.
tracked down the hashtags used in three different themes to create three datasets:
— Brazil: Brazil elections which took place in latter 2010, where |C| = 4, |V| = 88 and E[T ] = 166.
— TOT: Top US conservatives and liberals on Twitter, where |C| = 11, |V| = 45 and E[T ] = 189.
— Iran: Iran presidential elections in 2009, where |C| = 5, |V| = 45 and E[T ] = 395.
In each of the above datasets, we filtered out hashtags c that were used less than 500 times and users u who posted less
than four tweets with at least two of these hashtags or whose tweets were not retweeted more than four times by at least
2 followers. Moreover, for each of user u ∈ V , we tracked down the five followers who retweeted her tweets more
frequently and, for each these followers, we reconstructed the feedback they provided to her and others by collecting
all their retweets as well as the tweets posted by all the users they follow.
— Reddit: We used publicly available data gathered from Reddit5, which comprises the profiles of 5 million users
and 226 million comments posted by these users in the month of May, 2015. In our experiments, a user v provides
feedback to a message published by a user u if she replied to it and each topic c ∈ C corresponds to the subreddit in
which a comment was written. Here, we tracked down the subreddits in three different themes to create three datasets:
— Leisure: r/funny, r/pics and r/WTF, where |C| = 3, |V| = 3, 540 and E[T ] = 126.
— Sports: r/CFB, r/nba and r/nfl, where |C| = 3, |V| = 989 and E[T ] = 309.
5https://archive.org/details/2015 reddit comments corpus
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— Learning: r/AdviceAnimals, r/TodayILearned, r/AskReddit and
r/worldnews, where |C| = 4, |V| = 3, 505 and E[T ] = 218.
In each of the above datasets, we only considered users V who have made at least 20 top-level comments in at least
2 distinct categories c ∈ C. Moreover, for these users u ∈ V , we tracked down the five users who have replied to
their comments more frequently and consider them to be the neighbors of u. Finally, for each of these followers, we
reconstructed the feedback they provided to u and others by collecting all their replies as well as the comments posted
by all their neighbors.
Results. We determined whether each user in each of the six datasets utilizes the feedback she receives from each
of her followers to decide what to post next using the utility estimation framework described in Section 4. Figure 4
summarizes the results, which show that, at p-value p = 10−8, we can reject the hypothesis that users do not utilize
the feedback they receive from their followers for 53%, 64%, 82% of the users in the Twitter datasets and for 28%,
42%, 43% of the users in the Reddit datasets.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced a feedback model of posting behavior in social media. The model allowed us: (i) to
investigate under which conditions can a user succeed at maximizing the (positive) feedback she receives; and, (ii)
to determine whether a user utilizes the feedback she receives from each of her followers to decide what to post next
using observational data. Moreover, we performed experiments on synthetic and real data gathered from Twitter and
Reddit to illustrate our theoretical findings, show that our estimation methods are able to accurately recover users’
underlying utility functions, and provide empirical evidence that 53% − 82% of the users in the Twitter datasets and
28% − 43% of the users in the Reddit datasets use the feedback they receive from their followers to decide what to
post next.
There are many interesting venues for future work. For example, we have assumed that the followers’ preferences
are not influenced by the users’ posting behavior. It would be interesting to analyze a scenario in which both users and
the followers influence each other. We have considered a simple linear utility function, a natural next step would be
considering more complex utility functions with higher predictive power. Finally, it would be very interesting to apply
our utility estimation methods to real data from other social media platforms, e.g., Facebook.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Consider a special case, where the number of topics is K = 2; u has only one follower v with q1v > q2v = 12 ; the
weights av = au = 1/2; the user preferences x1u = x2u = q ≥ 0; and the prior parameters α = β = 3. Then, the
regret R(T ) is
1
2
∑
t∈[T ]
(
max{q1v + q, q2v + q} − (qctv + q)
)
Since, q1v > q2v , we have R(T ) = T2(q1v − q2v)/2, where T2 is the number of stories about topic 2. Now, α = β
makes the initial estimates qˆ1v(1) = qˆ2v(1) = 12 , and therefore, a topic is chosen randomly. Let us assume that topic 2
(the wrong category with minimum utility) is selected and a story from that topic is shared. If v likes this story, which
can happen with probability q2v = 1/2, then qˆ2v(2) = (1 + 3 − 1)/(1 + 6 − 2) = 3/5 > qˆ1v(2) = 1/2 and topic
2 is again selected at next time t = 2. At t = 3, qˆ2v(t) again increases (decreases) with probability 1/2 (1/2). Note
that, u keeps choosing topic 2 as long as qˆ2v(t) > 1/2 i.e. n2v(t) > n¯2v(t), and the possibility of selecting topic 1
only arises when n2v(t) = n¯2v(t). Such a situation can be mapped to an instance of a simple one dimensional random
walk, where the walker starts from origin at t = 1, if a story from topic 2 is shared. The walker moves to right (left) if
user v does (not) like the story. Now, the expected time of the first return to origin in a simple random walk is infinite.
Therefore, once u starts posting the messages with category 2, the expected time that n1v(t) = n2v(t) for the first time
t = tfirst →∞ [?]. Therefore, E(T2) = Θ(T ). More formally, we have:
E(T2) > E(T2|c1 = 2, lv(1) = 1)P(c1 = 2, lv(1) = 1)
= E(T2|c1 = 2, lv(1) = 1)P(lv(1) = 1|c1 = 2)P(c1 = 2)
=
1
4
E(T2|c1 = 2, lv(1) = 1) (14)
Now, in the random walk setting, E(T2|c1 = 2, lv(1) = 1) is the amount of time the walker stays on the positive
or right side of the line, and therefore, greater than the time of first return to origin, which is infinite. Therefore, the
walker stays on the right side for the entire T , given the first step is taken towards the right side is T . Hence, we have
E(T2|c1 = 2, lv(1) = 1) = T . hence E(T2) > T/4.
8.2 Proofs of Theorems 2 and 3
Preliminaries. To prove these theorems, we first present few notations which will be used throughout both the proofs.
For the sake of brevity, we define (i) qcu := xc; (ii) qˆcu(t) = xc for all t; (iii) N ∗(u) = N (u) ∪ {u}; (iv) kc(t)
as the number of posts made by broadcaster u up to and including time t, that have category c; (iv) Mcv(t) :=
Ncv(t)−kc(t−1); (v)Mcv(t) as the number of messages with category c, which umay observe as they are appearing
the wall of v until and excluding time t; (vi) FBetaα,β (.) as the c.d.f of Beta distribution with parameters α and β; (vii)
FBn,p(.) as the c.d.f in Binomial distribution with parameters n, p; (viii) fn,p(.) as the probability mass function in
Binomial distribution function; (ix) ηˆcv(t) := ncv(t)/Ncv(t); (x) ηˆi(t) :=
∑
v∈N (u) av ηˆcv(t) + auxc; (xi) ηc :=∑
v∈N (u) avqcv + auxc; (xii) θc :=
∑
v∈N (u) av qˆcv(t) + auxc; (xiii) pc,t := P(θ1(t) > ρc + auxc|Ht); and (xiv)
dKL(a, b) = a log(a/b) + (1− a) log((1− a)/(1− b)), where a, b ∈ [0, 1].
Furthermore, we define
∆Ht(t) :=
∑
c∈C
(∑
v∈N (u)
avqcv + auxc
)(
p∗(ct|Ht)− pˆ(ct|Ht)
)
a
=
∑
c∈C
∑
v∈N∗(u)
avqcv
(
p∗(ct|Ht)− pˆ(ct|Ht)
)
(15)
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Equality a is due to definitions (ii) qcu = xc and (iii) N ∗(u) = N (u) ∪ {u}.
So, EHT (∆Ht(t)) = EHtEHT \Ht(∆Ht(t)) = EHt(∆Ht(t))
Hence, EHT (R(T )) =
∑
t∈[T ]
EHt(∆Ht(t)) (16)
Proof of Theorem 2. We have,
∆Ht(t) = max
c∈C
∑
v∈N∗(u)
avqcv −
∑
v∈N∗(u)
avqctv
= max
c∈C
∑
v∈N∗(u)
avqcv −max
c′∈C
∑
v∈N∗(u)
av qˆc′v(t)
+ max
c′∈C
∑
v∈N∗(u)
av qˆc′v(t)−
∑
v∈N∗(u)
avqctv
a≤max
c∈C
∣∣∣ ∑
v∈N (u)
(
avqcv − av qˆcv(t)
)∣∣∣+ ∑
v∈N (u)
(
av qˆctv(t)− avqctv
)
≤ 2
∑
c∈C
∑
v∈N (u)
|qcv − qˆcv(t)| (17)
The inequality a is obtained using (i) the triangle inequality of max norm; (ii) the fact that ct = argmaxc′∈C
∑
v av qˆc′v(t);
and (iii) qˆcu(t) = qcu, where (iii) reduces the summation over N ∗(u) to N (u). Since, E(X) ≤
√
E(|X|2), we have
EHt(∆Ht(t)) ≤ 2
∑
c∈C
∑
v∈N (u)
√
EHt(qcv − qˆcv(t))2
= 2
∑
c∈C,v∈N (u)
√
ENcv(t)E((qcv − qˆcv(t))2|Ncv(t)) (18)
(qcv − qˆcv(t))2 can be written as,
q2cv − 2qcv
α+ ncv(t)− 1
α+ β +Ncv(t)− 2 +
( α+ ncv(t)− 1
α+ β +Ncv(t)− 2
)2
On expanding, we have E((qcv − qˆcv(t))2|Ncv(t)) to be same as
((α− 1)− qcv(α+ β − 2))2 +Ncv(t)qcv(1− qcv)
(α+ β +Ncv(t)− 2)2
=
κ1
(α+ β +Ncv(t)− 2)2 +
κ2
α+ β +Ncv(t)− 2 (19)
where κ1 = ((α− 1)− qcv(α+ β − 2))2 − qcv(1− qcv)(α+ β − 2) and κ2 = qcv(1− qcv). Finally we observe that,
(α+ β +Ncv(t)− 2)2 ≥ (α+ β − 2)(α+ β +Ncv(t)− 2). Hence,
E((qcv − qˆcv(t))2|Ncv(t)) ≤ κ1/(α+ β − 2) + κ2
α+ β +Ncv(t)− 2 (20)
From Eq. 18, we now have,
EHt(∆Ht(t)) ≤ 2
∑
c∈C
∑
v∈N (u)
√
ENcv(t)
κ1/(α+ β − 2) + κ2
α+ β +Ncv(t)− 2
≤ 2
∑
c∈C
∑
v∈N (u)
√
EMcv(t)
κ1/(α+ β − 2) + κ2
α+ β +Mcv(t)− 2 (21)
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Then we apply Lemma 6 to obtain the required bound.
Proof of Theorem 3. To prove this theorem, we leverage the proof techniques of Agarwal et al in [5]. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the set of categories C = [K]; c = 1 is the optimum true category with maximum utility.
We also denote τm denotes the time step at which a message with optimal category (i.e., category 1) is posted for the
m-th time. In this context, we denote,
Lc(T ) :=
1
dm
log
(
1 +
∑
v∈N (u)
1− exp(−µcv(1− e−dm)T )
µcv(1− e−dm)
)
(22)
Then, we define two numbers σc, ρc so that,
ηc < σc + auxc < ρc + auxc < η1 and,
1− ρc
ρc − σc /∈ Q
+, (23)
where Q+ is set of positive rational numbers. Note that for both σc, ρc, 0 < σc < ρc < 1. We define Eηcv(t) as the
event that ηˆcv(t) ≤ σc, and Eθc (t) as the event that θc(t) ≤ ρc + auxc. Note that, since (1− ρc)/(ρc − σc) /∈ Q+, So,
we have dKL((σcNcv(t) + nα)/(Ncv(t) + nα), ρc) > 0. Hence, we can define
dm = min
c,v
min
N∈N+
dKL((σcN + nα)/(N + nα), ρc) ≥ 0 (24)
To prove the theorem, in the first step, we show that the regret is proportional to the sum of number of times a
suboptimal category (kc(T ) for c 6= 1) is posted. Then we decompose this quantity into three suitable quantities and
provide individual bounds and then combine them. From, definition (xi), we note that η1 = maxc ηc. Therefore, the
expected regret is proportional to the number of times a suboptimal category c 6= 1 is posted.
EHT (R(T )) =
∑
c∈C
(
η1 − ηc
)
E(kc(T )) (25)
where we recall that kc(T ) is the number of times a message with category c has been posted up to and including time
T . So, kc(T ) =
∑
t∈[T ] 1(ct = c). Therefore, we have,
EHT (kc(T )) =
∑
t∈[T ]
P(ct = c) =
∑
t∈[T ]
P
(
ct = c,
⋂
v
Eηcv(t), E
θ
c (t)
)
+
∑
t∈[T ]
P
(
ct = c,
⋂
v
Eηcv(t), Eθc (t)
)
+
∑
t∈[T ]
P
(
ct = c,
⋃
v
Eηcv(t)
)
(26)
Now, we are going to bound these three sums individually.
— Bounding P
(
ct = c,
⋂
v E
η
cv(t), E
θ
c (t)
)
:∑
t∈[T ]
P(ct = c,
⋂
v
Eηcv(t), E
θ
c (t))
a≤
∑
t∈[T ]
EHt
(1− pc,t
pc,t
P(ct = 1,
⋂
v
Eηcv(t), E
θ
c (t))|Ht)
)
b≤
∑
t∈[T ]
E
(1− pc,t
pc,t
1(ct = 1)
) c≤ T∑
m=1
E
(1− pc,τm
pc,τm
)
Inequality a comes from Lemma 7. Inequality b comes from the fact that P(ct = 1, •) ≤ P(ct = 1) and in the
corresponding expression, the expectation is taken over all sources of randomness. Since, τm denotes the time step
at which a message with optimal category (i.e. c = 1) is posted for the m-th time, at times other than t = τm, the
indicator term becomes zero, which explains the last inequality c. From Lemma 8, we note that
∑T
m=1 E
(
1−pc,τm
pc,τm
)
is
T∑
m=1
∑
v∈N (u)
O
(
e−∆
2
cvm/2 +
e−Dcvm
(m+ 1)∆2cv
+
1
e∆
2
cvm/4 − 1
)
(27)
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which is Θ(1). Next we give bound of the second term in Eq. 26.
— Bounding
∑
t∈[T ] P(ct = c,
⋂
v E
η
cv(t), E
θ
c (t)). We observe that,
P(ct = c,
⋂
v
Eηcv(t), E
θ
c (t))
≤ P(ct = c, Eθc (t)
∣∣⋂
v
Eηcv(t),Ht)
≤ P
( ∑
v∈N (u)
av qˆcv(t) > ρc|
⋂
v∈N (u)
{ηˆcv(t) ≤ σc},Ht
)
a≤ P
( ⋃
v∈N (u)
{qˆcv(t) > ρc}|
⋂
v∈N (u)
{ηˆcv(t) ≤ σc},Ht
)
b≤
∑
v∈N (u)
P(qˆcv(t) > ρc|ηˆcv(t) ≤ σc)
c≤
∑
v∈N (u)
(1− FBetaσcNcv(t)+nα+1,(1−σc)Ncv(t)(ρc))
d≤
∑
v∈N (u)
FBNcv(t)+nα,ρc(σcNcv(t) + nα)
e≤
∑
v∈N (u)
exp
(
−Ncv(t)dKL
(σcNcv(t) + nα
Ncv(t) + nα
, ρc
))
(28)
Inequality a is due to the following. If qˆcv(t) < ρc for all v ∈ N (u), then
∑
v∈N (u) av qˆcv(t) <
∑
v∈N (u) ρc < ρc.
Inequality c is due to the fact that cdf of Beta(α, β) is decreasing w.r.t. α and increasing w.r.t β [5]. Inequality d is due
to the relation between Beta distribution with integer parameters and Binomial distributions [5, Fact 3, Appendix A].
Inequality e is due to Chernoff-Holding bound [5, Fact 1, Appendix A]. Then, from Eq. 28, we obtain that,
P(ct = c, Eθc (t)
∣∣⋂
v
Eηcv(t),Ht) ≤
∑
v∈N (u)
exp(−Ncv(t)dm) (29)
Now, we split Ncv(t) = Mcv(t) + kc(t − 1). For time t such that kc(t − 1) ≥ Lc(T ), we use the definition of dm
from Eq. 24 to have,
P(ct = c, Eθc (t)
∣∣⋂
v
Eηcv(t),Ht) ≤
∑
v∈N (u)
exp(−dm(Mcv(t) + Lc(T )))
Now consider that ts is the largest time until kc(t− 1) ≤ Lc(T ). Then we have,∑
t∈[T ]
P(ct = c,
⋂
v
Eηcv(t), E
θ
c (t))
≤
∑
t∈[T ]
EHt
(
P(ct = c, Eθc (t)
∣∣⋂
v
Eηcv(t),Ht)
)
≤ EHt
( ∑
t∈[ts]
P(ct = c, Eθc (t)
∣∣⋂
v
Eηcv(t),Ht)
)
+ EHt
( T∑
t=ts+1
P(ct = c, Eθc (t)
∣∣⋂
v
Eηcv(t),Ht)
)
≤ E( ∑
t∈[ts]
1(ct = c)
)
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+
∑
v∈N (u)
T∑
t=ts+1
EMcv(t) exp(−dmMcv(t)) exp(−dmLc(T ))
≤ Lc(T ) +
∑
v∈N (u)
∫ T
0
exp(−µcv(1− e−dm)t)dt exp(−dmLc(T ))
≤ Lc(T ) +
∑
v∈N (u)
1− exp(−µcv(1− e−dm)T )
µcv(1− e−dm) exp(−dmLc(T )).
Then we have,
∑
t∈[T ] P(ct = c,
⋂
v E
η
cv(t), E
θ
c (t)) has order
O
log (1 + ∑
v∈N (u)
1− exp(−µcvθmT )
µcvθm
) (30)
where, θm = 1− e−dm .
— Bounding
∑
t∈[T ] P(ct = c,
⋃
v E
η
cv(t)). We define tk is the time at which category c is posted kth time. Then, we
observe that ∑
t∈[T ]
P(ct = c,
⋃
v
Eηcv(t)) ≤ E
[ ∑
t∈[T ]
1(ct = c)1(∪vEηcv(t))
]
a≤ 1 + E[ ∑
m∈[T ]
1(∪vEηcv(tm))
] b≤ 1 +∑
v
E
[ ∑
m∈[T ]
1(Eηcv(tm))
]
c≤ 1 +
∑
v
∑
m∈[T ]
exp(−mdKL(σc, qcv)) = O(1) (31)
Inequality a holds because the indicator 1(Eηcv(tk)) is only activated when category c posted. Inequality b is due to an
union bound and inequality c is due to Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds [5, Fact 1, Appendix A]. Combining Eq. 27, 30,
31, we obtain the required bound.
8.3 Auxilliary lemmas
Lemma 5. If the rate of messages in v’s feed are exposed to u with Poisson distribution having rate µcv for each
category c, and Mcv(t) are total number of such messages for category c, observed until timestep t, then we have
E
( 1
Mcv(t) + δ
)
≤
{
1−e−µcv(t−1)
(t−1)µcvδ if δ < 1
1−e−((t−1)µcv+δ−1)
(t−1)µcv+δ−1 if δ ≥ 1
(32)
Proof: E
(
1
Mcv(t)+δ
)
can be written as,
∞∑
n=0
1
n+ δ
((t− 1)µcv)ne−(t−1)µcv
n!
(33)
=
∫ 1
0
∞∑
n=0
(µcv(t− 1)θ)ne−(t−1)µcv
n!
θδ−1dθ
=
∫ 1
0
e−µcv(t−1)(1−θ)θδ−1dθ (34)
— Case δ < 1. In this case, e−µcv(t−1)(1−θ) is increasing and θδ−1 is decreasing. So we apply Chebyschev inequal-
ity [28] to have ∫ 1
0
e−µcv(t−1)(1−θ)θδ−1dθ ≤
∫ 1
0
e−µcv(t−1)(1−θ)dθ
∫ 1
0
θδ−1dθ
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0.4 which provides the required expression.
— Case δ ≥ 1. Since θ ≤ e−(1−θ), δ ≥ 1 implies θδ−1 ≤ e−(1−θ)(δ−1). Hence, the required integral is less than∫ 1
0
e−((t−1)µcv+δ−1)(1−θ)dθ =
1− e(t−1)µcv+δ−1
(t− 1)µcv + δ − 1
Lemma 6. If Mcv(t) and µcv have the similar meanings as the previous lemma, then we have
T∑
t=2
√
E
( 1
Mcv(t) + δ
)
≤

√
T−1
√
1−e−(µcv(T−1))
2
√
µcv∆tδ
if δ < 1
T−1
2
√
(T−1)µcv+δ−1+
√
δ−1 if δ ≥ 1
(35)
Proof: For δ < 1, we have
T∑
t=2
√
E
( 1
Mcv(t) + δ
)
≤
∫ T
1
√
1− e−µcv(T−1)
(t− 1)µcvδ dt,
which gives the required bound. For δ ≥ 1, we have
T∑
t=2
√
E
( 1
Mcv(t) + δ
)
≤
∫ T
1
1√
µcv(t− 1) + δ − 1
dt
=
√
(T − 1)µcv + δ − 1−
√
δ − 1
2µcv
=
T − 1
2
√
(T − 1)µcv + δ − 1 +
√
δ − 1
Lemma 7. [5] If we define pc,t = P(θ1(t) > ρc + auxc|Ht), then
P(ct = c,
⋂
v
Eηcv(t), E
θ
c (t))|Ht) ≤
1− pc,t
pc,t
P(ct = 1,
⋂
v
Eηcv(t), E
θ
c (t))|Ht)
Lemma 8. If τj denote the time step at which the optimal category 1 is selected for the j-th time. Then,
E
( 1
pc,τj
)
= 1 +
∑
v∈N (u)
O
(
e−∆
2
cvj/2 +
e−Dcvj
(j + 1)∆2cv
+
1
e∆
2
cvj/4 − 1
)
,
where, ∆cv = q1v − ycv , Dcv = ycv log(ycv/q1v) + (1 − ycv) log((1 − ycv)/(1 − q1v)), ∆c = minv∈N (u) ∆cv;
ycv =
q1v(ρc+au(xc−x1))∑
w∈N(u) awq1w
. Note that from Eq. 23, ∆cv > 0 ∀v ∈ N (u).
Proof. We leverage the proof of [5, Lemma 4] to prove this lemma Let sv = n1v(τj), Yvj = N1v(τj).
pc,τj =P(θ1(τj) > ρc + auxc|Hτ )
a≥ P( ⋂
v∈N (u)
{qˆ1v(τj) > ycv}
)
=
∏
v∈N (u)
P(qˆ1v(τj) > ycv) (36)
Inequality a is because qˆ1v(τj) > ycv for all v implies∑
v∈N (u)
av qˆ1v(τj) >
∑
v∈N (u)
avycv = ρc + au(xc − x1),
so,
∑
v∈N (u)
av qˆ1v(τj) + aux1︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ1(τj)
> ρc + auxc.
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Now, P(qˆ1v(τj) > ycv) = 1− FBetasv+α,Yvj−sv+β(ycv)
a≥ 1− FBetasv+1,Yvj−sv+nβ (ycv),
b
= FBYvj+nβ ,ycv (sv)
Inequality a is due to the fact thatFBetaα,β (y) is increasing in β and decreasing inα, and we choose nβ > max(β, 8/∆cv).
Equality b holds due to for simple mapping from Beta distribution to Binomial distribution when the parameters for
Beta distribution are integers. Then, we have:
E(1/pc,τj |Yvj) =
Yvj∑
sv=0
∏
v∈N (u)
fYvj ,q1v (sv)
∏
v∈N (u)
1
FBYvj+nβ ,ycv (sv)∏
v∈N (u)
Yvj∑
sv=0
fYvj ,q1v (sv)
FBYvj+nβ ,ycv (sv)
(37)
We denote Sum(0, Yvj) =
∑Yvj
sv=0
fYvj,q1v (sv)
FBYvj+nβ,ycv
(sv)
, and observe that Sum(0, Yvj) = Sum(0, Yvj + nβ − 1). This is
because, fYvj ,q1v (s) = 0 for s > Ncv . We express Sum(0, Yvj + nβ − 1) as the sum of two terms Sum(0, b(Yvj +
nβ − 1)δc) + Sum(d(Yvj + nβ − 1)δe, Yvj + nβ − 1), where δ = (q1v −∆cv/2). We note that,
Sum(0, b(Yvj + nβ − 1)δc) =
b(Yvj+nβ−1)δc∑
sv=0
fYvj ,q1v (sv)
FBYvj+nβ ,ycv (sv)
a≤ 1
(1− q1v)nβ−1
b(Yvj+nβ−1)δc∑
sv=0
fYvj+nβ−1,q1v (sv)
FBYvj+nβ ,ycv (sv)
b≤ Θ(e−∆2cv(Yvj+nβ−1) + e
−Djv(Yvj+nβ−1)
((Yvj + nβ))∆2cv
)
≤Θ(e−∆2cvj + e
−Djvj
(j + 1)∆2cv
) (Since, Njv ≥ j) (38)
Inequality a is due the fact that
fYvj+nβ−1,q1v (sv) =
(
Yvj + nβ − 1
sv
)
qsv1v(1− q1v)Yvj+nβ−1−sv
≥ (1− q1v)nβ−1
(
Yvj
sv
)
qsv1v(1− q1v)Yvj−sv .
Inequality b is obtained by leveraging the proof of Lemma 4 in Agarwal et al in [5]. Now we bound Sum(d(Yvj+nβ−
1)δe, Yvj). Using the proof of Lemma 4 in Agarwal et al in [5], we have, FBYvj+nβ ,ycv (sv) > 1− e−∆
2
cv(Yvj+nβ−1)/4
for sv ≥ d(Yvj + nβ − 1)δe. Then, we have
Sum(d(Yvj + nβ − 1)δe, Yvj + nβ − 1)
=
Yvj+nβ−1∑
sv=d(Yvj+nβ−1)δe
fYvj ,q1v (sv)
FBYvj+nβ ,ycv (sv)
≤ 1/(1− e−∆2cv(Yvj+nβ−1)/4) ≤ 1/(1− e−∆2cvj/4)
= 1 +
1
e∆
2
cvj/4 − 1 (39)
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Adding, Eq. 38 and 39, and then substituting back to Eq. 37, we observe that, E(1/pc,τj ) equals to∏
v∈N (u)
(
1 + Θ
(
e−∆
2
cvj/2 +
e−Dcvj
(j + 1)∆2cv
+
1
e∆
2
cvj/4 − 1
)
≤ 1 +
∑
v∈N (u)
O
(
e−∆
2
cvj/2 +
e−Dcvj
(j + 1)∆2cv
+
1
e∆
2
cvj/4 − 1
)
,
The last inequality follows by taking only the dominating term.
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